Sistema de informação sobre comércio de elefantes (etis)
Sistema de Informação de Comércio de Elefantes (ETIS)
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Solicitar conta.
Se você não tiver sido reconhecido anteriormente como Provedor de dados, clique em Solicitar conta e uma página "Registro de provedor de dados" será aberta. Preencha todos os detalhes conforme indicado e clique em Registrar quando tiver terminado e desejar enviar. O seu pedido para ser um Fornecedor de Dados da ETIS para o seu país será encaminhado para o Secretariado da CITES para validação. O processo de validação pode demorar alguns dias, portanto, seja paciente. Você será notificado oportunamente assim que o processo de validação for concluído.
O Sistema de Informação de Comércio de Elefantes - comumente conhecido como ETIS - é a ferramenta exigida pela CITES para rastrear o comércio ilegal de marfim de elefante e outros produtos de elefantes. Administrado e operado pela TRAFFIC em nome das Partes da CITES, o ETIS foi concebido para estabelecer tendências no comércio ilícito de produtos de elefantes e mudanças nas tendências ao longo do tempo, e para avaliar se essas tendências estão ou não relacionadas às decisões da CITES para conservação de elefantes. Os objetivos para a ETIS também são comuns ao outro programa da CITES, Monitorando o Assassinato Ilegal de Elefantes ou o MIKE, que rastreia a caça furtiva de elefantes em estado selvagem através de um sistema baseado em sites, abrangendo a África e a Ásia.
Parque Nacional Kaziranga, Assam.
Crédito: Ola Jennersten / WWF-Canon.
Parque Nacional Amboseli, no Quênia.
Crédito: Martin Harvey / WWF-Canon.
Primeiro mandato das Partes da CITES na 10ª reunião da Conferência das Partes em 1997 através da Resolução Conf. 10.10 O comércio de espécimes de elefantes, ETIS contém os detalhes do relato de marfim e outras apreensões de produtos de elefantes que ocorreram em qualquer lugar do mundo desde 1989. O banco de dados de apreensões é apoiado por uma série de componentes de banco de dados subsidiários que avaliam o esforço e eficiência da lei. de relatórios, governança, fatores econômicos, mercados domésticos de marfim e outras variáveis de fundo que são baseadas no tempo e específicas do país. Desde 2002, o ETIS produziu análises abrangentes dos dados da ETIS para análise em cada reunião da Conferência das Partes da CITES.
Resolução Conf. 10.10 especifica que “Todas as Partes devem fornecer informações sobre apreensões e confiscos de marfim ou outros espécimes de elefantes… dentro de 90 dias da sua ocorrência.” A este respeito, as Partes da CITES são consideradas como “Fornecedores de Dados” para o ETIS. O site da ETIS foi concebido para fornecer aos Provedores de Dados que são designados por suas respectivas Autoridades Administrativas da CITES uma facilidade de envio de dados on-line para que os dados de apreensão de produtos de elefantes possam ser entregues à ETIS através de uma plataforma da Internet. Além disso, as Partes da CITES também podem usar este recurso para revisar ou baixar os dados em ETIS relacionados a eles, recuperar relatórios resumidos dos dados da ETIS e obter outros resultados que possam estar disponíveis de tempos em tempos. O site da ETIS irá mantê-lo conectado com os dados no ETIS e como eles se relacionam com o seu país.
TRAFFIC dá-lhe as boas-vindas como fornecedor de dados ao site da ETIS!
O que significa o ETIS?
ETIS significa Elephant Trade Information System (Convenção sobre o Comércio Internacional de Espécies Ameaçadas de Fauna e Flora Silvestres)
Esta definição aparece muito raramente e é encontrada nas seguintes categorias do Acreditador: Organizações Militares e Governamentais, ONGs, escolas, universidades, etc. Negócios, finanças, etc.
Banco de Dados de Abreviação Surfer & laquo; Anterior Próximo & raquo;
Amostras em arquivo de periódicos:
Todas as marcas registradas / marcas de serviço referenciadas neste site são propriedades de seus respectivos proprietários.
Sistema de Informação de Comércio de Elefantes (ETIS)
Monitoramento do comércio ilegal de marfim e outros espécimes de elefantes & # 8211; Relatórios ETIS.
Estes documentos são preparados e submetidos pela TRAFFIC International (T. Milliken, R. W. Burn, F. M. Underwood e L. Sangalakula). Com base em uma análise detalhada, a frequência do comércio ilegal de marfim é avaliada e informações valiosas sobre o comércio ilegal, regiões e países são apresentadas.
Fundo.
Resolução Conf. 10.10 (Rev. CoP15) mandata “um relatório abrangente para cada reunião da Conferência das Partes” sobre os dados mantidos no Sistema de Informação de Comércio de Elefantes (ETIS), um dos dois sistemas de monitoramento para elefantes sob a CITES. Os objectivos do ETIS, que foi gerido e operado pela TRAFFIC desde 1997, são:
medir e registrar níveis e tendências, e mudanças nos níveis e tendências, da caça ilegal e do comércio de marfim nos Estados da faixa dos elefantes, e nos entrepostos comerciais; avaliar se e em que medida as tendências observadas estão relacionadas a mudanças na listagem de populações de elefantes nos apêndices da CITES e / ou na retomada do comércio internacional legal de marfim; estabelecer uma base de informações para apoiar a tomada de decisões sobre necessidades apropriadas de gestão, proteção e aplicação; e capacitação nos estados de abrangência.
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O Sistema de Informação de Comércio de Elefantes (ETIS) e o Comércio Ilegal de Marfim: Um relatório para a 17ª reunião da Conferência das Partes da CITES.
Resolução Conf. 10.10 (Rev. CoP16) mandata “um relatório abrangente para cada reunião da Conferência das Partes” do Sistema de Informação de Comércio de Elefantes (ETIS). Este relatório é a sexta avaliação importante dos dados da ETIS para as Partes da CITES e constitui as obrigações de informação do TRAFFIC para a CoP17 ao abrigo da Resolução. Antes da submissão ao Secretariado da CITES, o documento foi revisado por membros do Grupo Consultivo Técnico do MIKE-ETIS. TRÁFEGO gostaria de agradecer o apoio financeiro do programa da União Européia intitulado “Minimizando a matança ilegal de elefantes e outras espécies ameaçadas”, o Fundo Africano de Conservação de Elefantes do Serviço de Pesca e Vida Selvagem dos EUA e WWF por fornecer apoio para a operação e gestão de ETIS desde a CoP16, incluindo a produção deste relatório.
PARTE I: OS DADOS DO ETIS.
Número de registros:
Em 25 de janeiro de 2016, o ETIS incluiu 24.636 registros de apreensão de produtos de elefantes, representando ações de aplicação da lei em 98 países ou territórios desde 1989. Neste momento, o ano de 2015 permanece deficiente de dados e não é considerado nesta avaliação, que é restrita principalmente às oito período de 2007 a 2014.
Figura 1: Estimativa do peso do marfim e número de casos de apreensão por ano, 1989-2014 (ETIS, 25 de janeiro de 2016)
Peso do marfim representado na base de dados das apreensões:
Quadro 1: Peso estimado do marfim em termos de equivalentes de marfim bruto (ERI) representados por dados de apreensão não corrigidos da ETIS, 2007-2014 (ETIS, 25 de janeiro de 2016)
Valores de equivalentes de marfim bruto (RIE) são usados para todos os dados de apreensão de marfim examinados neste relatório, assim uma estimativa do desperdício que ocorre durante o processo de fabricação de produtos de marfim trabalhados é considerada como parte do peso, permitindo valores de marfim trabalhados. e agregado com marfim bruto (ver CoP14 Doc. 53.2 Anexo para uma descrição do método utilizado para este cálculo). A Tabela 1 apresenta um resumo do peso estimado do marfim nos termos da RIE nesta análise. Vale a pena notar que nos quatro anos mais recentes, 2011-2014, as maiores quantidades de marfim desde 1989 foram apreendidas, de acordo com os dados da ETIS.
Atribuição de país de origem às apreensões de marfim após a avaliação do DNA.
Quadro 2: Número estimado de crises de marfim em grande escala (& gt; 500 kg) que foram examinadas forensemente de acordo com a Decisão 16.83 e os resultados reportados ao ETIS.
Ano n. º de apreensões de marfim em grande escala comunicadas à ETIS.
N. º de casos examinados legalmente com resultados reportados à ETIS De junho de 2011 13 0 2012 14 2 2013 20 7 2014 14 2 Total 61 11.
PARTE II: A ANÁLISE DA TENDÊNCIA.
Resolução Conf. 10.10 (Rev. CoP16) pede que o ETIS meça “níveis e tendências, e mudanças nos níveis e tendências” referentes ao comércio ilegal de marfim. No período de 2007 a 2014, a base de dados ETIS continha 9.899 registros de apreensão relativos a marfim bruto ou trabalhado. Em termos de peso, esses registros variam de um grama a 6.034 kg de marfim e o maior 1% desses registros representa 65% do peso total estimado do marfim apreendido nesse período.
Uma nota sobre métodos.
Este relatório baseia-se no quadro analítico para ETIS descrito em Underwood et al., (2013) e Burn & amp; Underwood (2013), com alguns refinamentos e revisões. Esse arcabouço básico também foi empregado para a análise do ETIS à CITES CoP16, e duas iterações subseqüentes da análise de tendências para as 65ª e 66ª reuniões do Comitê Permanente da CITES. Nesta análise para CoP17, as seguintes alterações são observadas:
Período de tempo da análise: Embora os dados da ETIS abranjam mais de 26 anos, as Partes da CITES estão principalmente interessadas em avaliar os fluxos de comércio ilícito de marfim contemporâneos (não históricos), especialmente o que aconteceu entre os intervalos das Conferências das Partes. Análises anteriores do ETIS documentaram repetidamente as tendências pós-proibição da CITES e permanecem disponíveis para consulta em termos de avaliação da continuidade e compreensão dos padrões comerciais de longo prazo. Para atualizar brevemente, na análise anterior apresentada à CoP16, que cobriu o período de 1996 a 2011, “a atividade ilegal de comércio de marfim permaneceu em níveis ligeiramente acima de 1998 até 2006. A partir de então, um aumento gradual da atividade ilegal de comércio de marfim se torna progressivamente maior. em cada ano consecutivo, com um grande aumento em 2011 ”(Milliken et al., 2012). Assim, 2007 foi visto como um ponto de inflexão e, nesta análise, torna-se o ponto de partida para avaliar o comércio num período de oito anos até 2014. Além disso, 2007 foi o ano anterior à segunda venda de marfim sob a CITES. lugar e foi o ano em que a CITES CoP14 concordou com o chamado “compromisso elefante” que impôs, após a venda única, uma moratória de nove anos sobre quaisquer futuras propostas de comércio de marfim daqueles países cujos elefantes foram incluídos no Anexo II do a Convenção. Por conseguinte, os primeiros cinco anos da presente análise coincidem com o relatório da CoP16, enquanto os últimos três anos introduzem novos dados, tendo em conta que os anos de 2012 e 2013 foram anteriormente avaliados nas análises de tendências apresentadas nas 65ª e 66ª reuniões da CITES. Comitê permanente. Olhando para além da CoP17, anos adicionais para estender a tendência para as reuniões do Comitê Permanente da CITES ou outros eventos que acontecem antes da CITES CoP18 serão adicionados a este conjunto de dados.
Classes de peso: Desde a CoP16, a análise ETIS descreveu as tendências do comércio ilegal de marfim usando três classes de peso para marfim cru e trabalhado separadamente: pequeno (menos de 10 kg), médio (10 kg a menos de 100 kg) e grande (100 kg ou Mais). Essa categorização geralmente funcionou bem em geral, exceto pela grande classe de peso de marfim trabalhada, pois há realmente muito poucos dados representando as apreensões dessa classe de peso. Por exemplo, há menos de quatro grandes convulsões por ano, em média, e em alguns anos nenhum ou apenas um caso, tornando-se um desafio modelar tendências com precisão. Consequentemente, nesta análise, as classes de peso de marfim médio e grande trabalhado foram combinadas para que resultados analíticos mais robustos possam ser produzidos.
Seleção de países: A análise do ETIS para a CoP16 empregou critérios baseados no número de convulsões e / ou limiares de peso para determinar os países na análise. O objetivo dos critérios era descrever a maior parte do comércio, mas excluir países que quase nunca fazem, ou estão implicados em apreensões, pois são muito difíceis de modelar e, na realidade, contribuem muito pouco para a análise.
O critério de peso é considerado problemático, dada a incerteza dos pesos e o uso de categorias de peso. Assim, nesta análise, um sistema de pontuação baseado em classes de peso foi usado para avaliar cada país. A este respeito, um ponto foi dado para cada apreensão (incluindo aqueles em que um país foi implicado na cadeia comercial, mas a apreensão foi feita em outro lugar) na classe de peso pequeno, 10 pontos para cada apreensão na classe de peso médio e 100 pontos para cada apreensão na classe de peso grande. Os países precisavam pontuar pelo menos 100 pontos em oito anos de dados a serem considerados. A este respeito, 55 países, representando 98% das apreensões em número e 99% em peso no período 2007-2012, foram examinados nesta análise.
Ajustamento por viés dos dados da apreensão ETIS: Os dados brutos da apreensão ETIS apresentados na Figura 1 não podem ser considerados como uma representação precisa do padrão de comércio ilegal de marfim, devido ao viés inerente aos dados. O viés surge devido a diferenças na capacidade dos países de, em primeiro lugar, fazer convulsões e, em segundo lugar, relatar as apreensões que fazem à ETIS. A estrutura de modelagem para abordar o viés é descrita em Underwood et al., (2013). A correção de viés possibilita produzir estimativas relativas de taxas de apreensão e de relatórios para cada país em cada ano, o que permite fazer comparações significativas entre os países ao longo do tempo. Para conseguir isso, é necessário identificar variáveis substitutas que respondam por diferenças nas taxas de apreensão e relatórios ao longo do tempo. Nessa análise, a covariável que melhor descreve a variabilidade na taxa de apreensão foi a taxa de esforço policial (LE) do ano anterior (ver CoP15 Doc. 44.1 Anexo para uma descrição); Nesse relatório, ele é usado como uma medida substituta para o esforço de aplicação da lei do ano atual. Em contraste com avaliações anteriores da ETIS, entretanto, medidas de governança não se mostraram úteis para explicar a variabilidade, incluindo o estado de direito dos Indicadores de Governança Mundial do Banco Mundial (que demonstraram correlação na análise da CoP16, mas se tornaram muito menos importantes nas duas - em análises de tendências apresentadas às reuniões do Comitê Permanente da CITES. Isso pode ocorrer porque os indicadores gerais de governança para os países em escala nacional podem não refletir efetivamente o microambiente mais específico por meio do qual o crime de comércio de animais silvestres se desdobra; o período de tempo reduzido também pode ser um fator. Assim, nesta análise, uma única covariável foi usada para determinar a taxa de convulsão. Para a taxa de notificação, uma combinação do CITES Annual Reporting Score (consulte CoP13 Doc. 29.2 para uma descrição) e Data Collection Effort Score, que é atribuída a cada registro de apreensão para descrever o processo no qual foi coletado , solicitado ou passivo). Esses fatores de ajuste de viés foram aplicados aos dados para obter indicadores relativos de números e pesos das transações ilegais de marfim por tipo de marfim e classe de peso. Corrigindo o viés nos dados e aplicando técnicas de suavização, as tendências apresentadas neste relatório ilustram medidas relativas (não absolutas) do nível do comércio ilegal de marfim. Desta forma, as mudanças nos dados das apreensões que podem resultar de um melhor esforço de aplicação da lei ou melhores relatórios são mitigados e o padrão subjacente do comércio ilícito é revelado mais claramente.
O Índice de Transação - avaliando a frequência do comércio ilegal de marfim.
Figura 2: Tendências no Índice de Transações por tipo de marfim e classe de peso com média (ponto em negrito) e intervalos de confiança de 90%, 2007-2014 (ETIS 25 de janeiro de 2016)
A figura 2 apresenta padrões de atividade comercial por tipo de marfim e classe de peso, com a melhor estimativa de comércio representada pelo ponto em negrito e as linhas verticais representando 90% de limites de confiança. No geral, pode-se observar que, em todas as classes de peso, exceto uma, as transações ilícitas parecem ter atingido o pico em 2012 ou 2013 e caíram ligeiramente em 2014. No entanto, os intervalos de confiança amplamente sobrepostos alertam contra a interpretação excessiva desses resultados e a confirmação de se uma desaceleração real ocorreu definitivamente será mais conhecida, à medida que os dados nos anos subseqüentes forem analisados. Isto é especialmente verdadeiro no que diz respeito às transacções de marfim em bruto em todas as três categorias de peso. Para o marfim trabalhado, a redução mais robusta na classe de peso inferior a 10 kg é largamente compensada por um aumento aparente na classe de peso médio / grande combinado, o que contrasta com as outras tendências de classe de peso na Figura 2.
Figura 3: Índice de Transações que combina classes de peso por tipo de marfim, 2007-2014 (ETIS, 25 de janeiro de 2016)
A maior redução na atividade de comércio de marfim para qualquer classe de peso diz respeito a transações de marfim pequenas e trabalhadas em 2014 que são inferiores a 10 kg. Desde então, a publicidade sem precedentes da CITES CoP16 sobre o comércio ilegal de marfim e o status dos elefantes africanos tem sido uma característica constante nos meios de comunicação de um número crescente de países em todo o mundo, incluindo os principais mercados de uso final na Ásia; a redução de transações de marfim pequenas e trabalhadas poderia sugerir que a crescente conscientização e a evitação de compra de marfim pelos potenciais consumidores está começando a ocorrer. Por outro lado, a tendência crescente em transações de marfim trabalhadas de médio / grande porte poderia resultar de um aumento na produção de marfim trabalhado na África para os mercados asiáticos, bem como no movimento comercial de estoques de marfim trabalhado na Ásia para locais mais favoráveis para vendas no varejo.
Figura 4: Índice de Transação composto de todos os tipos de marfim e classes de peso com média (ponto negrito) e intervalos de confiança de 90%, 2007-2014 (ETIS 25 de janeiro de 2016)
O Índice de Peso - avaliando a escala do comércio ilegal de marfim.
O Índice de Peso permite que a quantidade relativa de marfim no comércio seja avaliada por tipo de marfim em classes de peso. Este índice resulta da combinação do Índice de Transações com um modelo para atribuir o peso a cada apreensão em cada classe de peso. Como anteriormente enfatizado, o ETIS não foi projetado para fornecer níveis ilícitos de comércio de marfim em valores absolutos de peso, mas o padrão agregado de dados ajustados por viés é indicativo da quantidade relativa de marfim sendo movida por canais de comércio ilegal anualmente.
Figura 5: Índice de Peso que combina classes de peso por tipos de marfim com intervalos de confiança de 90%, 20072014 (ETIS 25 de janeiro de 2016)
Agregando todas as classes de peso, a Figura 6 apresenta uma estimativa dos totais de peso relativo por ano com limites de confiança de 90% representados pelas linhas verticais. Na maioria dos aspectos, o padrão de comércio espelha o Índice de Transação (ver Figura 4), mas a sugestão de declínio em 2014 é muito menos pronunciada no Índice de Peso, dado o fato de que a menor mudança em termos de atividade ilícita de comércio de marfim ocorreu com respeito às grandes apreensões de marfim. A este respeito, é novamente notado que o nível real de comércio poderia ser concebivelmente em qualquer ponto ao longo do intervalo de confiança, com a maior probabilidade sendo o ponto médio que é marcado como o ponto em negrito. Com isso em mente, se as quantidades de comércio realmente diminuíram, ainda é preciso ver em análises de tendências futuras. A principal conclusão é que, desde 2012, a quantidade de marfim no comércio ilegal permaneceu razoavelmente constante nos níveis mais altos já registrados nas avaliações dos dados da ETIS desde 1989; esses níveis de comércio são cerca de três vezes maiores do que as quantidades de 2007, a linha de base para essa análise.
Figura 6: Índice de peso composto de todos os tipos de marfim e classes de peso com média (ponto negrito) e intervalos de confiança de 90%, 2007-2014 (ETIS 25 de janeiro de 2016)
PARTE III: A ANÁLISE DO CLUSTER
Resolução Conf. 10.10 (Rev. CoP15) obriga o ETIS a estabelecer “uma base de informações para apoiar a tomada de decisões sobre as necessidades apropriadas de gestão, proteção e aplicação”. A este respeito, os dados do ETIS são avaliados para identificar os países / territórios mais proeminentemente implicados no comércio ilícito de marfim, para que possam ser consideradas as intervenções adequadas nos termos da Convenção. Isto é conseguido usando análise de cluster hierárquico aglomerativa, em que os países e territórios são agrupados em um dendrograma para formar uma série de clusters definidos que compartilham padrões semelhantes nos dados de apreensão. As características desses agrupamentos podem ser descritas para elucidar a dinâmica e os fatores subjacentes ao comércio. A análise de cluster permite que o "ruído de fundo" nos dados seja removido e os atores mais importantes e seus papéis no comércio ilícito de marfim sejam revelados.
Formando os clusters:
Nesta análise de cluster, 55 países ou territórios foram comparados. Os dados foram os totais de 2012 a 2014 para cada uma das seguintes variáveis ajustadas por viés:
o Índice de Transacção por tipo de marfim por classe de peso;
o número total de apreensões superiores a uma tonelada (em bruto e trabalhadas combinadas);
peso total das apreensões acima de uma tonelada (cru e trabalhado em conjunto);
número total de "apreensões fora" (ou seja, apreensões em que um país tenha sido.
implicado como parte da cadeia de comércio, mas não fez a apreensão em si); e.
peso total de "apreensões fora".
Figura 7: A análise de cluster (ETIS, 25 de janeiro de 2016)
O resultado é o dendrograma tipo móvel representado na Figura 7, que é formado pelos componentes que exibem características semelhantes agrupando-se em conjunto. Uma linha horizontal foi desenhada logo abaixo da marca de 5 graus, resultando na formação de clusters no ponto de interseção com as linhas verticais que sustentam os países / territórios sendo avaliados. Os pontos finais de todos os grupos devem ser considerados como caindo no ponto 0 do eixo vertical de 'altura'. Análises anteriores do ETIS resultaram na formação de 12 ou 14 agrupamentos; desta vez 13 clusters resultam, compreendendo entre uma e oito entidades em cada agrupamento.
O grau de separação vertical entre vários aglomerados ou seus componentes individuais é medido pela distância percorrida ao longo do eixo vertical, o que fornece uma medida relativa de dissimilaridade. Por exemplo, na Figura 7, os 42 países que começam no lado esquerdo dos Emirados Árabes Unidos (AE) e terminam com a Zâmbia (ZM) compartilham a maior distância dos 12 países que começam com a China (CN) e terminam com Togo (TG) no lado direito do dendrograma, pois é necessário percorrer todo o eixo vertical de cerca de 2 graus para a marca de 19 graus, a fim de conectar qualquer um dos componentes que caem nessas duas direções distintas. grupos; isso constitui uma divisão crítica nessa análise de cluster. Na melhor das hipóteses, os grupos-chave de clusters apresentam uma lógica bastante inequívoca em termos de seus atributos subjacentes e servem ao propósito de priorização para focar as intervenções de acompanhamento. Infelizmente, nem todos os grupos revelam uma coesão clara e tipicamente alguns grupos residuais são formados, demonstrando mais diversidade e resolução mais fraca em termos de características definíveis. De um modo geral, esses grupos são componentes menos importantes da análise, mas podem conter entidades individuais que podem emergir em clusters mais proeminentes no futuro. Finalmente, deve-se entender que o uso de outros conjuntos de variáveis poderia levar a um agrupamento diferente de países, mas, no interesse da consistência com a análise da CoP16, as mesmas variáveis foram usadas para que as comparações possam ser feitas.
Tabela 3: Estatísticas resumidas para os 13 grupos de análise de cluster com base nos dados de apreensão informados pelas Partes sem ajuste de tendência, 2012-2014.
(1) A frequência é medida pelo "número médio" de apreensões comunicadas no período 2012-2014 (ou seja, o número total de todas as apreensões que foram cometidas por ou implicaram cada país / território no grupo dividido pelo número de entidades no cluster); números altos indicam maior frequência; números baixos indicam menor freqüência.
(2) A escala é medida pelo "peso médio" das apreensões comunicadas no período 2012-2014 (ou seja, o peso total de marfim representado por todas as apreensões que foram feitas por ou implicaram cada país / território no grupo dividido por o número de entidades no cluster); números altos indicam maiores pesos de marfim; números baixos indicam pesos menores de marfim.
(3) O esforço de aplicação da lei, a eficácia e as taxas de notificação são medidos, em primeiro lugar, pelo indicador de governança do Banco Mundial para o estado de direito (ou seja, a pontuação total da lei de cada país no período de 2012-2014 dividida pelo número de entidades no cluster dividido pelo número de anos); as pontuações variam de -2,5 (desempenho de governança mais fraco) a 2,5 (desempenho de governança mais forte).
(4) O esforço de aplicação da lei, a eficácia e as taxas de notificação são medidos, em segundo lugar, pela "média LE / rácio de comunicação" no período 2012-2014 (ou seja, o número total de apreensões no país dividido pelo número total de apreensões foram feitas por, ou implicaram, cada país / território no grupo dividido pelo número de entidades no cluster); os rácios variam de 0,00 (nenhum esforço de aplicação da lei) a 1,00 (melhor esforço de aplicação da lei).
(5) O envolvimento da criminalidade organizada é medido tomando-se a proporção do peso médio das apreensões comunicadas que representam apreensões em larga escala (isto é, aquelas apreensões iguais ou superiores a 800 kg de peso de marfim (RIE) em que determinado país / território feito ou estava implicado em) no período 2012-2014; valores altos.
indicar a presença do crime organizado no movimento do marfim; valores baixos indicam a ausência do crime organizado no movimento do marfim.
(6) O comércio interno de marfim é medido pela «classificação média do mercado»; as pontuações variam de –2,5 (nenhum ou muito pequeno mercado de marfim doméstico altamente regulamentado) a 12 (grandes mercados domésticos de marfim não regulamentados).
Descrevendo os resultados:
A Tabela 3 apresenta estatísticas resumidas agregadas para os 13 grupos que servem para destacar várias características do comércio ilícito de marfim exibido por um determinado cluster. Para os clusters de um único país, as estatísticas refletem os dados apenas para esse país específico, mas para os clusters compostos por dois ou mais países, as estatísticas representam a média de todos os componentes constituintes. As variáveis explicativas apresentadas são as mesmas utilizadas no relatório da CoP16, com uma exceção, para facilitar comparações significativas, se necessário. A única exceção diz respeito ao período de medida de atividade que não foi utilizado desta vez, pois todos os grupos de clusters estavam mais ativos no período de 2012-2014. Note-se também que o relatório da CoP16 utilizou apreensões de 800 kg ou mais como medida indicadora para avaliar os movimentos de marfim que supostamente estão ligados ao crime organizado (enquanto os próprios clusters foram formados utilizando convulsões superiores a uma tonelada de marfim ou mais). variável ajustada pelo viés); isto também reflete o que foi feito no relatório da CoP16. Finalmente, embora a medida do Estado de Direito do Banco Mundial não tenha sido útil para efetuar ajustes de viés nesta análise, ela é aqui apresentada como uma medida de governança e novamente serve para manter a continuidade com o relatório ETIS submetido à CoP16. . Finalmente, deve-se notar que a ordem numérica dos grupos de clusters não é um ranking de importância.
O seguinte pode ser dito sobre cada grupo nesta análise de cluster:
Grupo 1 - Malawi (MW), Malásia (MY), Cingapura (SG), Togo (TG): A Malásia foi identificada na análise de cluster da CoP16 como um 'país de preocupação primária', dado seu papel como um importante centro de trânsito na área ilegal. Comércio de marfim. Desta vez, Cingapura, do mesmo modo, emergiu no mesmo papel e une-se a Togo e Malawi, ambos servindo como entreposto de marfim ou como pontos de saída na África Ocidental e Austral, respectivamente. Esses quatro países estão reunidos em um agrupamento pela primeira vez como resultado de desenvolvimentos ocorridos desde 2012. Em geral, esses países raramente fizeram e relataram ataques de marfim à ETIS, e foram raramente implicados nas apreensões feitas por outros, como evidenciado por a medida muito baixa de frequência. No entanto, as apreensões que eles fizeram, ou foram implicados, geralmente eram muito grandes, dando ao grupo o quarto maior valor de peso nesta análise. É digno de nota que este cluster teve a maior proporção do peso total relativo a apreensões de 800 kg ou mais, sugerindo que a maior parte do tráfego ilícito de marfim que circulava por e destes países era uma atividade criminosa organizada de nível superior. A regra coletiva da lei como medida de governança está claramente em território positivo, mas o valor é distorcido pelo impacto de Cingapura, que teve a quarta melhor pontuação nacional de qualquer país em toda a análise de cluster. Comparativamente, uma pontuação para Malawi e Togo juntos se tornaria um valor negativo entre os Grupos 2 e 4, indicando que a perspectiva de falha na governança comercial era uma preocupação muito mais preocupante nesses países de origem africana do que é sugerido pela estatística agregada. . Da mesma forma, o coeficiente médio de aplicação da lei é bastante fraco para esse grupo, sugerindo que quantidades consideráveis de tráfego ilícito de marfim provavelmente passam por esses países sem serem detectadas. A pontuação do mercado doméstico de marfim é baixa, com pouca evidência de comércio significativo, no entanto, nem o Malawi nem o Togo foram pesquisados nos últimos anos. Por outro lado, sabe-se que o mercado de marfim de Cingapura declinou substancialmente (Webber et al., 2013) e a Malásia há muito tempo é reconhecida por não ter um mercado interno de marfim (Martin & amp; Stiles, 2002).
Grupo 2 - Camboja (KH), Sri Lanka (LK): Como o primeiro cluster, esse grupo também surge como resultado de novos desenvolvimentos na análise pós-CoP16, em particular, cada um fazendo uma grande apreensão que estava em trânsito para destinos finais não divulgados. Caso contrário, a comunicação à ETIS tem sido geralmente fraca para ambos os países e muito poucas apreensões parecem ter ocorrido ou implicado em qualquer um destes países, para além de alguns registos adicionais, que incluem pequenos produtos de marfim trabalhados com valores de peso muito baixos. Isto é evidenciado pelos baixos valores para o número médio de apreensões, mas maiores valores para o peso médio do marfim apreendido, um resultado que espelha a situação do Grupo 1, mas em escala muito reduzida. A maioria dos dados sobre apreensões diz respeito a dois grandes movimentos de marfim, a marca registrada do crime organizado. A pontuação média da regra da lei é um valor negativo, indicando que as questões de governança podem ser problemáticas, mas, em termos de interdição de marfim, o índice médio de imposição da lei sugere melhor desempenho. O valor do mercado doméstico de marfim atinge o nível médio superior geral, mas a pontuação resulta principalmente de uma situação em desenvolvimento no Camboja em que um aumento na disponibilidade de produtos de marfim foi observado no principal destino turístico do país em Siem Reap (dados inéditos do TRAFFIC, 2015).
Grupo 3 - Quénia (KE), Tanzânia (TZ): Este agrupamento compreende os dois países da África Oriental através dos quais o maior comércio ilegal de marfim tem origem na África desde 2009, de acordo com os dados das apreensões na ETIS, que está atrás das duas nações. sendo identificados como 'países de interesse primário' na análise da CoP16.
Kenya and Tanzania regularly submit large numbers of seizure cases to ETIS, and overall made about six times more seizures themselves than those reported by other countries in which they were implicated; numerous cases made inside and outside of these two countries involve large quantities of ivory. It is, therefore, not surprising that this cluster has the second highest values for the mean number of seizures and the mean weight of ivory seized. Two-thirds of the ivory for which Kenya and Tanzania either seized themselves or were implicated in since 2012 represented large-scale consignments, indicating a strong presence of organised criminal activity behind the trafficking from these countries. In terms of governance, the mean rule of law score is the third most problematic in this analysis, indicating that corruption could be a significant factor in the trade. But this worrisome result could be offset by the law enforcement effort ratio of this group, which is tied for the second best score in this analysis. Further, the domestic market score for Kenya and Tanzania is the lowest in this assessment which points to active suppression of local trade in ivory curios given the large tourist industries found in both countries.
Group 4 – Hong Kong SAR (HK), Uganda (UG), Viet Nam (VN): This group comprises countries and territories that were all identified in the previous CoP16 analysis as ‘countries of primary concern’, with Hong Kong SAR (a Special Administrative Region of China) and Viet Nam cited primarily as major transit conduits for large quantities of ivory and Uganda as an important entrepôt/export centre in East Africa with clear links to Central African ivory trade flows. This group exhibits a high value for the mean number of seizures during the period 2012-2014. Indeed, both Hong Kong SAR and Uganda have greatly increased the number of seizures being made and reported to ETIS during this period, whereas the number of seizures made and reported by Viet Nam has actually declined; equally, Viet Nam and Uganda were more frequently implicated in seizures made by others, whilst Hong Kong shows considerable decline in this respect. This group exhibits the third highest value for weight, indicating that numerous seizures continue to be large-scale events. Over threequarters of the weight of the ivory seized involved shipments that are over 800 kg of ivory, which points to the involvement of organised criminal groups. Although a slight negative value, the governance measure for rule of law falls in the middle, whilst the law enforcement effort ratio is fairly robust, indicating reasonably good law enforcement performance. The measure for internal trade in ivory is relatively high owing to the ongoing legacy of Hong Kong SAR’s ivory trade from previous decades (Martin & Vigne, 2015) and growing evidence of ivory processing in Viet Nam, especially for cross border ivory markets primarily catering to Chinese tourists (Liu, 2015).
Group 5 – China (CN): As before on every occasion, China falls into a single country cluster as the attributes of its ivory trade remain unuely dissimilar to all other countries under consideration. In the CoP16 analysis, China was identified as a ‘country of primary concern’. Once again, China has the highest values for the mean number of seizures and the mean weight of ivory seized, according to seizures data, with the country continuing to be a major destination for illicit ivory. The proportion of seizures that involved large movements of ivory, and hence the presence of higher-level organised crime, has decreased somewhat to about half of the weight of ivory seized when compared to previous assessments. Looking at governance measures, the rule of law indicator is well below average and could signal problematic challenges, however, China’s law enforcement effort ratio is the highest in this analysis suggesting dedicated performance overall in terms of interdicting illicit ivory. The high number of non-criminal seizures with low weight values indicates ongoing commitment in terms of policing people and cargo coming into China. China’s domestic ivory market score is the highest in this analysis and comes at a time when the legal ivory trading system has been criticised for regulatory abuse (Vigne and Martin, 2014; 2011b), and illicit internet and social media trade beyond physical markets has come into greater focus as a problematic law enforcement challenge (Xiao & Wang, 2015). Since 2002, successive ETIS analyses have identified the Chinese market as the key driver behind illicit trade in ivory, a finding that remains true in this current assessment as well.
Group 6 – France (FR), Sudan (SD), India (IN), Zambia (ZM): There is nothing intuitive about this mixed grouping of a European country, two African Elephant range States and the South Asian country that holds the largest Asian Elephant population; however, all four countries were part of the same cluster in the CoP16 analysis. In terms of reporting to ETIS, India is the exception and it is noteworthy that no data has been received from the India government for some nine years, yet evidence of illegal ivory trafficking was regularly reported in local media in that country. Falling in the middle in terms of the mean number of seizures, and showing a low mean weight value, this grouping is not particularly noteworthy. Further, none of the seizures have involved large ivory consignments of 800 kg or more so there is little to suggest active organised criminal activity. Assessing governance, the mean rule of law measure shows a negative value which could signal corruption problems, but the very high law enforcement effort ratio seems to indicate generally good performance where ivory trade is concerned. Finally, with a very low market score, this group of countries does not appear to play an obvious problematic role at the retail level, but no market surveys in Sudan have transpired in recent years.
Group 7 – Congo (CG), Ethiopia (ET), Nigeria (NG), Cameroon (CM), Gabon (GA), South Africa (ZA), Thailand (TH): All countries in this group are African Elephant range States, with the exception of Thailand, an Asian Elephant range State. In the CoP16 analysis, Thailand was identified as a major end-use market for ivory and, together with South Africa, was noted as a ‘country of primary concern’. All other countries in the group were considered ‘countries of secondary concern’ in the CoP16 report. Indeed, that Thailand and South Africa now fall in this cluster represents a positive shift since 2012. Congo, Cameroon and Gabon are all considered to be important sources of ivory, much of which is illegally exported by Nigeria, a regional entrepôt. It is worth noting that 60% of the seizure data reported to ETIS on seizures occurring in these three countries since 2012 has come from the EAGLE Network (Eco-Activists for Governance and Law Enforcement). Ethiopia is in this cluster given its role as a major air transport hub connecting Africa with Asia. Overall, Ethiopia accounts for 70% of the number of seizure records reported to ETIS by this group. Collectively, this group falls in the upper middle range in terms of frequency and scale, but the mean weight variable is artificially lower than it should be in that much of the raw ivory generated in these countries loses its identity as it moves along the trade chain. The governance values for this group are problematic with the rule of law score being the second poorest of any group in this analysis, whilst the law enforcement ratio is seriously inflated given Ethiopia’s good performance in terms of making and reporting ivory seizures to ETIS. Removing the positive influence of Ethiopia from this cluster, the law enforcement effort ratio sinks to the second lowest position in this analysis because most countries in the group are rarely making seizures. In terms of large-scale ivory movements, about half of the seizures appear to have involved organised criminal elements, which is a greater value than was the case in the CoP16 analysis for most of these countries. The domestic ivory market score is also relatively high, largely owing to the situation in Nigeria and Thailand, although the Thai market has experienced major decline following implementation of new legislation (TRAFFIC, in prep.). Other former markets, such as Congo, Cameroon, Ethiopia and Gabon have taken active measures to suppress local ivory markets and appear to be sustaining this challenge with relative success (Martin and Vigne, 2009; Sone Nkoke et al., in prep.).
Group 8 – Botswana (BW), Zimbabwe (ZW), Namibia (NA): As in the CoP16 analysis, three of the four African Elephant range States whose elephant populations were transferred to Appendix II in 1997 fall in the same group. These countries regularly report data to ETIS. In terms of all data which implicate these countries in an ivory seizure, this southern African grouping reflects middle range values in terms of mean number of seizures and the mean weight of ivory seized. The measure for assessing the presence of organised crime stands at zero which is indisputably a good sign. Governance indicators are mixed, however, with the rule of law score problematic and suggesting the presence of corruption, but the relatively high law enforcement ratio partially mitigates that concern. Indeed, as before, Zimbabwe is the country that pulls the rule of law score down, indicating far greater governance challenges exist in that country, but it is worth noting that Namibia’s scores have also dropped too. The domestic ivory market score is low, reflecting the complete absence of a market in Botswana and a very low level of trade in Namibia. Again, Zimbabwe is the exception with the tenth largest ivory market of any country in this analysis.
Group 9 – Austria (AT), South Korea (KR), Lao PDR (LA), Turkey (TR), Rwanda (RW), Macau SAR (MO), Philippines (PH), Saudi Arabia (SA): This residual grouping features a very eclectic range of entities. It includes the Philippines which was identified in the CoP16 analysis as a ‘country of primary concern’ primarily owing to its role as a transit destination for large consignments of ivory from Africa. The fact that this country now falls within this cluster points to a major shift in that country’s contemporary connection to evolving ivory trade dynamics. Indeed, like the Philippines, ‘occasional’ transit countries could be an underlying theme of this group as South Korea, Lao PDR, Turkey, Macau SAR and Saudi Arabia have all played this role in at least one recent large ivory seizure case. In terms of frequency, this group almost never made and reported seizures, and was rarely otherwise involved in the trade chains of seizures reported by other countries. Thus, this group has the lowest mean number of seizures, however, interdictions typically involve the large ivory weight class. The governance indicator for rule of law is relatively high, but there is considerable variability within the group, with most entities providing positive scores, however, Lao PDR, the Philippines and Rwanda contribute negative scores. On the other hand, the law enforcement ratio is second poorest score overall in this analysis which is probably why these countries are chosen as pathways for large-scale movements of ivory that are orchestrated by organised crime syndicates; indeed, almost all of the weight of ivory seized represented shipments of 800 kg or more. Consequently, some countries in this group could emerge (or re-emerge, in the case of the Philippines) as important transit points in the future. The mid-range market score is mostly driven by the situation in Lao PDR, which appears to be growing (Krishnasamy, in prep.), and the Philippines; neither of these markets are believed to comply fully with the requirements of Resolution Conf. 10.10 (Rev. CoP16).
Group 10 – Australia (AU), United States (US), Belgium (BE), Germany (DE): This group of relatively wealthy countries pretty much demonstrates positive attributes across the board in this analysis. The frequency and scale measures point to a large number of mostly low weight seizures, indicating the persistent interdiction of worked ivory ‘personal effects’ products from returning tourists and other similar seizures. This group collectively displays commendable governance values with the highest scores for rule of law and the second highest law enforcement ratio. The cluster is also not implicated in any large-scale ivory seizures indicating a general absence of higher level organised criminal activity. The domestic ivory market score is in the lower middle range, reflecting the situation in the United States and Germany where active domestic ivory trade in mostly pre-Convention and antue items occurs.
Group 11 – Switzerland (CH), Italy (IT), Egypt (EG), Netherlands (NL): This group of European nations and Egypt has a very modest mean number of seizures and the mean weight value is the lowest in this assessment. The governance indicators are mid-range with the rule of law score barely positive but a more robust law enforcement ratio, although the latter score is somewhat compromised by the fact that Italy has not reported any ivory seizures to ETIS in over six years. Since 2012, there is no evidence of involvement in largescale flows of ivory. The domestic ivory market score is the third lowest in this analysis with a general absence of trade activity in the three European countries, but Egypt harbours one of the largest unregulated ivory markets that reportedly fails to meet the requirements of Resolution Conf. 10.10 (Rev. CoP16) (Martin & Vigne, 2011).
Group 12 – Burundi (BI), Democratic Republic of the Congo (CD), Côte d’Ivoire (CI), Ghana (GH), Liberia (LR), Guinea (GN), Qatar (QA): The Democratic Republic of the Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Liberia, and Guinea are all African Elephant range States but with very small extant elephant populations. Historically, Burundi was a major ivory entrepôt in Central Africa, whilst Qatar enters the cluster as an important Middle Eastern air transport hub connecting Africa with Asia. These countries almost never made and reported ivory seizures to ETIS, indeed, only eight cases for seven countries over the three-year period, 2012-2014, but they were collectively implicated in 281 seizures made in other countries. Both the mean number of seizures and the mean weight are modest for this group. None of the seizures data, however, seemed to involve movements of ivory over 800 kg in a single shipment. This group has the worst scores in terms of the governance indicators: the mean rule of law is the lowest of all groups, as is the law enforcement effort ratio. The domestic ivory market score, however, is the third highest in this analysis, with markets in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Côte d’Ivoire and Guinea being especially problematic.
Group 13 – United Arab Emirates (AE), Angola (AO), Japan (JP), Mozambue (MZ), Spain (ES), United Kingdom (GB): This cluster comprises a residual grouping of countries that play markedly differing roles in the ivory trade. Angola and Mozambue are African elephant range States and ivory exporters in various forms, whereas the United Arab Emirates is one of the world’s leading transport hubs connecting Africa to Asia. Japan is a longstanding end-use market, including a participant in both of the one-off ivory sales under CITES since the 1990 trade ban, whilst the contemporary ivory trades to the United Kingdom and Spain typically involve non-commercial seizures from tourists. It is worth noting that only the United Arab Emirates and the United Kingdom have regularly provided seizure data to ETIS since 2012 and they collectively accounted for two-thirds of all seizures reported by this group. With the exception of the United Kingdom, all of these countries are far more likely to be implicated in seizures that are made elsewhere. For this cluster, both the mean number of seizures and the mean weight of ivory seized fall right in the mid-range of this analysis. Worryingly, this cluster has the third highest value for the proportion of seizures that involved 800 kg of ivory or more, the indicator that signals the involvement of organised crime in the trade. This latter result is primarily due to the fact that, in 2012, the second largest ivory seizure ever recorded in ETIS was shipped from Lome, Togo to Algeciras, Spain for transhipment on to Malaysia. Overall, the governance indicator for rule of law is extremely positive, however, the contribution of individual countries is highly variable for such an eclectic group. Rule of law scores are very positive for the United Arab Emirates, Japan, Spain and the United Kingdom, but very negative for Angola and Mozambue. This group ranks the third lowest in terms of law enforcement ratio and only the United Kingdom seems to contribute decidedly positive values to the collective score. This group also has the second highest domestic ivory market score as all countries except the United Arab Emirates and Spain have significant markets. Indeed, Angola’s market is arguably the largest in Africa (Martin & Vigne, 2014), whilst Mozambue’s domestic market is also problematic (Huang, 2013). Japan, with a local carving industry, albeit one in decline (Kitade & Toko, 2016), is still one of Asia’s largest ivory markets, whilst the United Kingdom by virtue of an historical legacy of once being the greatest ivory importing nation on earth also has a sizeable market for antue and pre-Convention worked specimens (Martin & Stiles, 2005; Wilson et al., in prep.).
Assessing the results of the cluster analysis:
‘Countries of primary concern’
Looking at Figure 7 and the explanatory statistics in Table 3, Groups 1, 3, 4 and 5 are the priorities of greatest concern in the illicit trade in ivory in this analysis. Accordingly, China, Hong Kong SAR, Kenya, Malawi, Malaysia, Singapore, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda and Viet Nam collectively account for the greatest quantity of illegal ivory in trade, according to the seizures data in ETIS. The countries in all four of these groups have been highly implicated in illicit ivory trade movements over the last three years and were part of the trade chains in 94% of the large-scale ivory seizures reportedly made that represent higher-level criminal activity since 2009. Six of these countries, plus Hong Kong SAR, were previously identified as first-tier priorities in the analysis to CoP16 and are already part of the NIAP process which is unfolding under the direction of the CITES Standing Committee. On the basis of this analysis, Malawi, Singapore and Togo now emerge as countries which the Parties could consider for inclusion in the CITES oversight process to address illegal trade in ivory.
African ‘countries of primary concern’: Since the CoP16 analysis, organised criminal elements operating in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda have continued to move large quantities of ivory into, between, and out of these three East African countries, which collectively constitutes the greatest illicit ivory trade flows out of Africa in the period 2009 through 2014. Most of this traffic is directed through Indian Ocean seaports, but air transport is also a factor in the trade. Tanzania has been the source of the greatest portion of this ivory and the Tanzanian government has subsequently reported a 60% decline in the country’s elephant numbers since 2009, with major population collapses noted for the Selous-Mikumi, Ruaha-Rungwa and Moyowosi-Kigosi ecosystems (the first two locations being MIKE sites) (Nyalandu, 2015). In addition, ivory from Mozambue, Kenya, Malawi, Zambia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo was also part of this traffic, according to forensic research to determine ivory origin (Wasser, et al., 2015). Since 2012, corruption issues have continued to be a major problem in all three countries, with various reports documenting serious governance shortfalls at ports of entry and exit, within government institutions charged with protecting wildlife, and by political and economic elites in these countries, including ivory stock thefts, and various judicial failings such as ordering the release of seized ivory or suspects on bail, or imposing mediocre penalties (Vogt, 2015; Anon., 2014a; EIA, 2014; Kahumbu, 2014; Musene, 2013; Wildlife Direct, 2013).
Figure 8: Law enforcement ratio for large-scale ivory seizures which involve Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda as part of the trade chain (ETIS 25 January 2016)
Togo and Malawi are noted as priority countries of concern for the first time in this report. Togo has emerged as a leading ivory entrepôt and exporter since 2012 in spite of being in a region with very few extant populations of elephants and almost no elephants at all nationally (AED, 2013). Indeed, Togo’s ivory trade is entirely predicated upon elephant attrition in Central African forests, East African savannahs and, to a lesser extent, remnant populations in other parts of West Africa (Wasser, et al., 2015). The second largest ivory seizure ever reported to ETIS, involving over six tonnes, was exported from the country’s major seaport in Lome. The Parties may now wish to include Togo in the NIAP process. Malawi’s prioritisation in this analysis is primarily based on a single large-scale ivory seizure that links with Tanzania, but Malawi has a history of being an ivory entrepôt and exporter in Southern Africa. For example, the largest ivory seizure ever made and reported to ETIS, involving over seven tonnes of ivory, was exported from Malawi in 2002; it is worth remembering that local Asian criminal syndicates were identified in the case, but none were ever arrested and prosecuted (EIA, 2002). As progress is made in shutting down the East African ivory trading hub, a shift to Malawi is very possible and clearly something to guard against. For this reason, the Parties might consider whether Malawi should become part of the NIAP process.
Asian ‘countries of primary concern’: As in every ETIS analysis since 2002, China continues to be the main end-use destination for ivory from Africa, but in the most recent analysis it is apparent that significant quantities of raw and worked ivory have also been seized coming from Japan (Anon., 2015b). Since 2005, China has allowed a domestic ivory trade subject to strict regulation which has previously been described in SC53 Doc. 20.1; noncompliance with certain provisions has been a serious issue spurring illegal trade in recent years (Vigne & Martin, 2011b; 2014). Following CoP16, the Chinese government clarified the necessity for accredited ivory dealers to have and publicly display ivory product certification cards for all retail inventory and that such cards must be given to consumers at the time of purchase. Since 2013, law enforcement actions in China stand behind at least seven manufacturers and 27 accredited retailers losing their licences (Anon., 2014b). More fundamentally, the Chinese government seems posed for major policy changes: in May 2015, the Chinese government announced it was working to “eventually halt” commercial processing and sale of ivory and its products. In September 2015, China’s intentions were more firmly revealed during a State visit of Chinese President Xi Jinping to the United States where it was jointly announced that both countries would “commit to enact nearly complete bans on ivory import and export, including significant and timely restrictions on the import of ivory as hunting trophies, and to take significant and timely steps to halt the domestic commercial trade of ivory” (Anon., 2015a). Prior to the U. S. visit, on 26 February 2015, China imposed a one-year trade ban on the import of ivory carvings acquired after CITES took effect in 1975, including all worked ivory trade that might transpire in conjunction with Namibia and Zimbabwe’s annotation to the Appendix II listing of their elephant populations. Later in the year, further measures prohibited the import of elephant trophy imports through 15 October 2016; both of these trade bans, and a ban on pre-Convention ivory carvings, were then subsequently extended through December 2019 (SFA, 2016). Awareness raising activities, including two highly-publicized ivory destruction events, and various demand reduction initiatives, are presently unfolding in China. Dedicated law enforcement to interdict ivory coming into China and to ferret out illicit ivory trade in the Chinese market and through the internet has also continued, including some novel partnerships with NGOs and private sector players. Evidence from on-going market monitoring suggests that illegal channels for retail ivory trade are progressively moving away from physical markets to e-commerce through the internet using courier delivery services to move products to consumer; more recently, exclusive social media platforms that function on an invitation-only basis are gaining prominence as an important means of conducting illegal ivory trade in China (Xiao & Wang, 2015; Guan & Xu, 2015). Such trade obviously presents difficult law enforcement challenges not just for China but for countries all over the world. Further, active cross-border wildlife markets in Viet Nam, Myanmar and Lao PDR have developed primarily for Chinese consumers with little apparent interference from the authorities in these neighbouring countries (Ammann, 2016: Liu, 2015; Nijman & Shepherd, 2014; 2012).
Hong Kong SAR, identified at CoP16 as a priority of ‘primary concern’, continues to function primarily as a transit intermediary for ivory destined for the Chinese mainland, but also harbours one of the world’s largest domestic ivory markets, a legacy of the thirty-year period prior to the CITES trade ban when, as a British colony, the territory hosted the largest ivory carving industry in the world. Recent ivory market studies in Hong Kong SAR have noted that local ivory carving has completely collapsed since the reversion of Hong Kong SAR back to China in 1997, but large stocks of worked ivory products remain in numerous retail outlets in the city (Martin & Vigne, 2015). Ivory consumption by Hong Kong SAR citizens appears to be minor and possibly reflects a Chinese community where a high degree of demand reduction has been achieved as an enduring attribute of local culture; in recent years, mainland Chinese buyers are reported to dominate retail ivory sales, but import back to China without permits is illegal (Martin & Vigne, 2015). Allegations that Hong Kong SAR’s domestic market is engaged in large-scale “illegal ivory laundering” linked to current elephant poaching in Africa (Lo & Edwards, 2015), however, cannot be confirmed through assessment of ETIS data. In the meantime, Hong Kong SAR authorities have announced steps to improve law enforcement and trade regulation on various fronts. The ETIS data, however, suggest that the number of seizures made by Hong Kong SAR authorities in the period 2012-2014 has more than tripled over the previous three-year period, demonstrating increased attention to policing air cargo and passengers arriving in the city. Further, the government of Hong Kong SAR, like the Chinese government, has suggested that a total ivory trade ban may be imposed in the near future, but precise plans and a time table have yet to be articulated.
Figure 9: Proportion of bias-adjusted ivory trade activity involving China and Hong Kong SAR compared to trade activity for all other countries (Mean values of the ETIS Transaction Index, 25 January 2016)
Viet Nam, another country identified as a ‘country of primary concern’ at CoP16, continues to serve as a transit country for ivory destined for China, according to Vietnamese authorities. Most of these seizures have been made at the port of Haiphong near Ha Noi, but in more recent years Phouc Long ICD Port in Ho Chi Minh City and Da Nang in Central Viet Nam have made numerous seizures; if this ivory is destined for China using overland travel, these ports greatly increase the distance to the border with China. Other evidence, however, suggests that local ivory processing in Viet Nam has been escalating over the last three years (Vigne & Martin, in prep.), and is being found for sale in considerable quantities in places such as Buon Ma Thuot City in Dak Lak province in the central highlands that have not previously been identified as locations for significant domestic ivory trade (Nguyen & Willemsen, 2015). Of particular concern are a series of villages in the vicinity of Hanoi that reportedly support a growing cross-border market in wildlife products with China with relative impunity (Liu, 2015; Ammann, 2016). The open display of ivory (and other wildlife products such as rhino horn) in these markets indicates a lack of targeted law enforcement action in Viet Nam; indeed, not a single ivory seizure case reported to ETIS by Viet Nam in this period concerns law enforcement action in the market place.
Another issue of increasing concern is the number of Vietnamese nationals being apprehended in or coming from Africa with ivory, including instances that appear to be orchestrated by criminal syndicates operating in Angola, Mozambue, South Africa and Togo, according to ETIS seizure data.
There is no contemporary evidence of any significant domestic ivory trade transpiring in Malaysia (Martin & Stiles, 2002), whilst Singapore’s former local market has declined further in recent years (Webber et al., 2013). As such, both countries serve exclusively as transit countries in the trade chains that link African suppliers with Asian end-use markets. In the analysis presented at CoP16, and again in this one, Malaysia remains the leading transit destination for large ivory consignments. The scale of the trade directed to Malaysia remains a serious concern and has increased in the more recent period, although law enforcement authorities in the country have made fewer seizures than was the case in the period 2009-2012. The trade through Singapore, possibly now being used an alternative to Malaysia, has also grown far more prominent in the recent period 2012-2014. For this reason, Singapore now joins Malaysia as a ‘country of primary concern’ in this analysis. Thus, the Parties should consider whether Singapore should be included in the NIAP process. In this regard, both countries need to focus upon risk assessment, intelligence gathering and targeting with respect to containerised sea and air cargo moving between Africa and prominent destination locations in Asia; the use of controlled deliveries and sniffer dogs is another important consideration for supporting effective law enforcement.
‘Countries of secondary concern’
It is considered that Groups 2 and 7 constitutes the priorities of ‘secondary concern’ in this analysis. Accordingly, Cambodia, Cameroon, Congo, Ethiopia, Gabon, Nigeria, Sri Lanka, South Africa and Thailand fall in these clusters.
African ‘countries of secondary concern’: The three Central African countries, Gabon, Congo and Cameroon, are the source of the most significant quantities of ivory going into trade from the Central African region; the bulk of the ivory that has been subjected to DNA testing in conjunction with ivory seizures associated with Togo and Nigeria, has been sourced to these three countries (Wasser et al., 2015). It is believed that small vessels often transport this ivory to Togo or use land routes through Cameroon into Nigeria. The domestic ivory markets in Gabon, Congo and Cameroon, that were still active in successive studies in 2007 and 2009, are now much diminished and have gone underground in the face of active suppression in all three countries (Sone Nkoke et al., in prep.). Beyond law enforcement risks, local carvers are reportedly being displaced by Chinese ivory trading networks due to their inability to offer competitive prices for raw ivory; indeed, in Congo, the “vertical integration from source, through transformation/carving, transportation and marketing by the same Chinese [players]has considerably reduced the importance of local carvers in the ivory business” (Sone Nkoke et al., in prep.). According to ETIS data, commercial consignments of worked ivory products from Congo have been seized in Asia with increasing frequency since 2012. It should also be noted that reporting seizure data to ETIS has generally improved, often with assistance from the EAGLE Network, especially with respect to Cameroon and Gabon. With few elephants of its own, Nigeria is, after Togo, the second most prominent ivory exporting nation on the western side of the African continent, functioning as a major ivory entrepôt that draws in ivory from Central Africa and, increasingly, as far away as East Africa. Nigeria also harbours a large unregulated domestic ivory market (Martin & Vigne, 2013), and processing of ivory products for commercial-scale export to China (primarily bangles and name seals) using courier services or individual carriers is a regular feature of this trade. Any further increase in trade is likely to shift Nigeria into a more prominent position in a future ETIS analysis, but it is encouraging to note that the National Environmental Standards and Regulations Enforcement Agency in Nigeria has, for the first time, been sending regular ivory seizure data to ETIS. Ethiopia functions mainly as an important air transport hub connecting Africa with Asia, thus many small and medium-sized ivory consignments repeatedly transit through the country from other parts of Africa. Indeed, 87% of Ethiopia’s seizure cases in 2014 (91 out of 105 cases) involved Chinese nationals transiting the country, and in China’s ETIS dataset for 2014 one-third of the 240 seizure cases involved ivory coming from or transiting Ethiopia. In this regard, Addis Ababa’s international airport remains a major transit hub and use of sniffer dogs would certainly be useful. On the other hand, Ethiopia’s domestic ivory market is much diminished from earlier assessments (Martin & Vigne, 2009). Finally, it is noted that Ethiopia’s dataset in ETIS is, since 2011, one of the best of any African country. South Africa was regarded as a ‘country of primary concern’ in the ETIS analysis to CoP16, but has moved into this group of lesser prominence this time owing to the fact that it has not been implicated in any large-scale ivory seizures since 2012. However, South Africa has a very poor record of submitting seizure data to ETIS in recent years, owing to the lack of a centralised reporting system and the fact that most provinces continually fail to submit data directly. Thus, South Africa’s position in this analysis is certainly clouded by the country’s lack of systematic participation in ETIS.
Asian ‘countries of secondary concern’: Thailand was regarded as ‘country of primary concern’ in the CoP16 report and, indeed, every ETIS analysis since 2002. Thus, the movement of Thailand into this cluster should be regarded as a very positive development. Of particular note, Thailand was not the destination for any largescale ivory seizures in the period 2012-2014, which has improved the country’s standing in the current analysis significantly. Further, in the context of its NIAP, a series of far-reaching changes in policy, legislation, law enforcement and awareness initiatives have been rolled out by the government with strong NGO support, especially from WWF and on-going market monitoring by TRAFFIC. Although still a priority of ‘secondary concern’, given the past positioning of this nation in ETIS analyses, Thailand has arguably made the most impressive strides of any country in addressing illegal ivory trade problems since CoP16.
Asian Elephant range States Cambodia and Sri Lanka comprise Group 2, but are considered ‘countries of secondary concern’ even though they appear on the far right-hand side of Figure 7 amongst those countries regarded as greater priorities. This is because these two countries have only been involved in one large-scale seizure each since 2012, whereas all of the first-tier priorities have been involved in multiple large movements of ivory. In fact, Cambodia was considered a ‘country important to watch’ in the CoP16 analysis and since then has been the destination for a single three-tonne shipment of ivory; whether this consignment was for use in Cambodia or re-export elsewhere remains unclear. There are reports that the domestic ivory market in Cambodia may be expanding (TRAFFIC, unpublished data), although the last assessment showed a declining retail-level trade (Martin & Martin, 2013). Sri Lanka was also a transit country in the context of another large ivory movement, but has otherwise never before appeared in an ETIS analysis as a significant concern. The Parties should consider inviting Sri Lanka to join the NIAP process which Cambodia is already part of.
‘Countries important to watch’
In terms of other countries which fall in residual cluster groups that may not adequately highlight the salient attributes of their involvement in ivory trade, several countries are noted as ‘countries important to watch’. This is done in order to raise attention and track existing and emerging developments which could potentially become problematic in terms of sources, trade routes or markets in future iterations of the ETIS analysis. Accordingly, in this analysis, Angola, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Egypt, Japan, Lao PDR, Mozambue, the Philippines, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates are considered to be countries that are ‘important to watch’. Indeed, all of these nations held this distinction in the CoP16 analysis except the Philippines, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Egypt, which were either countries of ‘primary’ or ‘secondary concern’. Most of these countries have already developed NIAPs; the Parties may wish to invite Japan, the only outlier in this regard, to become part of the NIAP process.
African ‘countries important to watch’: All of these countries have significant domestic ivory markets. In recent years, Luanda, Angola has been one of the largest unregulated domestic ivory markets in all of Africa, however, a ban on ivory trading was reportedly imposed in March 2016, although the state of implementation remains to be assessed (Hungerford, 2016). It is of concern to note that commercial scale exports of raw and worked ivory from Angola have continued throughout the period under examination, according to ETIS data. Reports indicate that Central Africa’s largest ivory market in Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of the Congo is still in operation openly selling ivory products at a new location in the capital city (Sone Nkoke, in. litt., 4 May 2016); bringing this market into compliance with CITES requirements for internal trade in ivory is an unfulfilled goal of the country’s NIAP and the Democratic Republic of the Congo should continue to be held accountable for the lack of progress in this regard. Similarly, in various coastal cities in Mozambue, fewer ivory carvings are openly displayed, but such products are readily available in local markets upon request (Huang, 2013). Mozambue’s wildlife trade penalties remain among the most lenient in all of Africa, with imprisonment not an option for cases involving ivory trafficking (as opposed to elephant poaching), even when very large quantities of ivory are involved; the government is moving to address this problem, but the current situation serves to create an enabling environment for wildlife trade crime to flourish. Thus, Asian criminal syndicates in particular continue to use Mozambue as a favorable base for moving ivory, rhino horns and other wildlife products to Asia. Mozambue almost never reports seizure data to ETIS, but the country has been implicated in the trade chains of various large movements of ivory in recent years. Further, if the East African ivory trading hub that is presently centered upon Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda continues to be suppressed actively, the prospect of a Malawi/Mozambue hub, collectively or unilaterally emerging cannot be discounted. Finally, Egypt, which is not an African Elephant range state, continues to harbour a large ivory market which, when last assessed, did not comply with CITES requirements outlined in Resolution Conf. 10.10 (Rev. CoP16) (Martin & Vigne, 2011a). Like the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Egypt needs to be held accountable for its domestic ivory market. For these reasons, these four African nations remain countries that are ‘important to watch’.
Asian ‘countries important to watch’: Japan, a two-time designated importer in the CITES-approved one-off ivory sales under the Convention, remains a major ivory market with a longstanding indigenous carving industry. Currently, this industry is largely sustained through the purchase of recycled ‘personal effects’ ivory which has been in the country for decades but is no longer wanted for display purposes in private homes or businesses (Kitade & Toko, 2016). However, regulatory loopholes and lapses have been exposed in recent years whereby unregistered ‘personal effects’ ivory is being sold to local manufacturers without first being registered in the government’s database of all commercially-eligible stocks of ivory as required by law (EIA, 2015a). Of even greater concern is on-going evidence that such ivory is also being illegally exported to China in significant quantities, including one Chinese couple who were arrested, prosecuted and sentenced to 15 years imprisonment in China for importing more than 3.2 tonnes of raw and worked ivory from Japan over an 18month period of time between November 2010 and April 2012; this traffic involved multiple shipments, none of which were detected in Japan prior to their export (Anon., 2015b; Yuan Liu, CITES Secretariat, in litt., 10 December 2015). Further, monitoring of internet trading in ivory products in Japan has also exposed a number of problematic issues which need to be addressed by the Japanese government (Matsumoto, 2015). The situation in Japan remains of concern but there is consolation in the fact that the ETIS data do not provide any recent evidence that Japan is a destination for the significant illegal ivory flows presently leaving Africa. Still, for a variety of valid reasons, the Parties may wish to consider Japan for inclusion in the NIAP process going forward.
Although the Philippines has moved from being a ‘country of primary concern’ to a ‘country to watch’, it still harbours a domestic ivory carving industry that is primarily focused on the production of religious artifacts for local consumption. It is not yet recognised that this domestic ivory market complies with CITES requirements for internal trade as outlined in Resolution Conf. 10.10 (Rev. CoP16) and, for this reason, the Philippines should remain a country that is ‘important to watch’ and held accountable for its ivory market. Lao PDR is one of the few elephant range States that has never reported a single ivory seizure to ETIS since 1989, but is noted as having an increasing ivory market (Krishnasamy, in prep.; Nijman & Shepherd, 2012). Further, it has been the destination for large movements of ivory on at least two occasions in the recent past, with other reports suggesting that much of the wildlife trade in Lao PDR benefits neighbouring China and Viet Nam (EIA, 2015b). Further, in the face of sustained regulation of Thailand’s ivory market, there are concerns that quantities of ivory currently in that country may shift to Lao PDR as an available retail outlet; this has occurred in the past with respect to live animal trade. Lao PDR should remain a country that is ‘important to watch’.
Both Qatar and the United Arab Emirates host a number of highly successful airline companies that have made these Gulf States one of the world’s most important air transport hubs, particularly in terms of connectivity between Africa with Asia. As such, both nations have become key transit points for illicit ivory trade, particularly for small ‘personal effects’ and mid-sized commercial consignments, but also occasional large-scale movements of ivory, moving to other destinations. Both countries were identified as ‘countries important to watch’ in the CoP16 analysis. Looking at bias-adjusted data in the most recent period 2012-2014, levels of trade have only increased marginally in the United Arab Emirates but an increase of more than 40% is noted for Qatar. It would be prudent to continue to regard these two nations as ‘important to watch’.
PART IV: IVORY STOCKPILE INVENTORIES.
Whilst the MIKE programme tracks the illegal killing of elephants and becomes a means for estimating the relative quantity of ivory being generated from illegal off-take in elephant range States, another source of ivory supply moving into illegal trade concerns theft from government-controlled stocks in countries found anywhere along the trade chain or disposal from undocumented private stockpiles. Unfortunately, there has been no formal mechanism for tracking the status of ivory stocks globally under the Convention until 2013 when Resolution Conf. 10.10 (Rev. CoP16) was adopted by the Parties. As a result, a reporting requirement for an annual declaration of ivory stocks was recommended. In paragraph e), under Regarding trade in elephant specimens, the Parties were requested to:
maintain an inventory of government-held stockpiles of ivory and, where possible, of significant privately held stockpiles of ivory within their territory, and inform the Secretariat of the level of this stock each year before 28 February, indicating: the number of pieces and their weight per type of ivory (raw or worked); for relevant pieces, and if marked, their markings in accordance with the provisions of this Resolution; the source of the ivory; and the reasons for any significant changes in the stockpile compared to the preceding year.
Accordingly, the Parties have now had three occasions to report their ivory stocks to the CITES Secretariat since CoP16. In this report, the ivory stockpile reports submitted for 2014 and 2015 are assessed.
In 2014, only twelve Parties (Ethiopia, Gabon, Germany, Japan, Malawi, Malaysia, New Zealand, Philippines, Slovakia, Thailand, Uganda and Zambia) submitted ivory stock reports with inventory figures, whilst two Parties (Greece, Malta) submitted reports that stated they held no ivory stockpiles. Five more Parties (Belgium, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Kenya, the European Union and Tanzania) submitted reports indicating they had ivory stocks but provided no figures on the status of these inventories. In 2015, only five Parties (Chad, Congo, Namibia, Thailand and Zimbabwe) submitted ivory stock reports with inventory figures. Further, only Germany and Zambia provided information on privately-owned stocks. Collectively, over the two years, these stocks accounted for nearly 463.5 tonnes of ivory under the control of 16 Parties, including private stocks.
Whilst the Parties that provided reports with stock inventories should be commended for meeting their reporting obligations under the Convention on the status of their ivory stockpiles, overall compliance with this recommendation remains exceptionally poor and is an issue of concern. For example, most of the countries that are presently part of the NIAP process — China (and Hong Kong SAR), Kenya, Tanzania and Viet Nam of ‘primary concern’, Cameroon, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Egypt, Mozambue, and Nigeria of ‘secondary concern’, and Angola, Cambodia, Lao PDR, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates which are ‘important to watch’ — did not submit any reports whatsoever, or only provided reports that did not fulfill the requirements and specify ivory stock inventory figures. For these non-reporting NIAP countries, an estimated 171.2 tonnes of ivory had been seized and reported to ETIS since 2007, the time period of this analysis; in fact, other stocks from earlier years certainly exist for many countries and a greater quantity of ivory is believed to be held by these countries.
Further, only eight of 37 African Elephant range States and two of 13 Asian Elephant range States submitted ivory stock declaration reports. Other countries, which have seized between one and three tonnes of ivory from 2007 through 2014 but have not submitted an ivory stock inventory, include France, Singapore and the United States. Finally, Burundi, which had a documented stockpile of nearly 84 tonnes when last examined in 2004 by TRAFFIC/CITES MIKE for the Secretariat, did not report; TRAFFIC has since confirmed that ivory tusks which formerly comprised part of Burundi’s ivory stockpile were seized by Ugandan authorities in March 2015, but the status of the rest of the Burundi stockpile remains unknown. Other thefts of government ivory stocks have reportedly occurred in Kenya, Mozambue, Philippines, Thailand, Uganda, Viet Nam and Zimbabwe in recent years (Nkala, 2016; Bocha, 2013; Milliken et al., 2012).
It is acknowledged that, since 2007, at least 24 separate ivory stock destruction events, involving an estimated total of 226.6 tonnes of ivory, have occurred in 20 countries (Cameroon, Chad, China, Congo, Belgium, Ethiopia, France, Gabon, Hong Kong SAR, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Malaysia, Malawi, Mozambue, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand, United Arab Emirates, United States). It is believed that some of the destroyed ivory involves some part of previously declared stocks by Ethiopia, Malaysia, Malawi and Thailand, and part of the stocks that were held in many of the non-reporting countries to CITES. Many destruction events have occurred without benefit of an independent audit to ensure what is reportedly being destroyed is actually destroyed. In at least one instance, ivory stock destruction involved specimens that were part of an ongoing law enforcement case (TRAFFIC, 2015), and there are concerns that many opportunities for forensic examination are being lost.
The fact is that most CITES Parties, including many being held accountable for addressing ivory trade issues, are failing to meet the reporting requirement for ivory stockpiles. It is important for the CITES Parties to consider how to achieve better implementation of the ivory stock reporting requirement in Resolution Conf. 10.10 (Rev. CoP16).
PART V: CONCLUSIONS.
Conclusions of the trend analysis:
This analysis presents the trend in illicit trade in ivory from 2007 through 2014 using bias adjusted data which allows effective tracking of illegal ivory trade activity through Transaction and Weight Indices. The following conclusions can be made:
Global illicit ivory trade activity rapidly escalated from 2007 onwards, and possibly peaked in 2012, the year before CITES CoP16 (Figure 4). The salient finding for now is that illegal ivory trade transactions reached their highest levels in 2012/2013 since the CITES ivory trade ban was agreed in 1989. The result for the most recent year, 2014, suggests that trade activity is beginning to drop at this time but mostly for transactions in the small worked ivory weight class (Figure 3). However, given the large confidence interval associated with the result for that year, the prospect of a downturn will only be possible to validate when subsequent years of data are assessed.
Concerning the weight of ivory in illicit trade, the pattern of the trend differs from the Transaction Index in that the prospect of decline in 2014 is far less (possibly even non-existent) owing to the fact that the level of change in the large raw ivory weight class, which accounts for the most ivory in illegal trade, has been marginal. Until there is significant change in this weight class any decrease in the quantity of illicit ivory in trade will remain modest. Thus, effectively investigating large-scale ivory seizure cases to identify the criminal syndicates behind them remains a crucial concern.
Conclusions of the cluster analysis:
With respect to the cluster analysis, which focused upon assessment of illicit ivory trade data in the period 2012-2014, the following conclusions can be made:
There are few surprises in this cluster analysis and most countries previously noted as priorities remain priorities. In this regard, China, Hong Kong SAR, Kenya, Malawi, Malaysia, Singapore, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda and Viet Nam are linked to the greatest illegal ivory trade flows since 2012 and are noted as the ‘countries of primary concern’ in this analysis. As a consequence, the Parties should consider whether Malawi, Singapore and Togo should be included in the NIAP process.
Equally, Cambodia, Cameroon, Congo, Ethiopia, Gabon, Nigeria, Sri Lanka, South Africa and Thailand, represent the ‘countries of secondary concern’ as they repeatedly play important supporting roles in the illicit ivory trade, especially large movements of ivory. Five of these countries were previously assigned this category of prioritisation at CoP16, but in this iteration Cambodia, Sri Lanka, South Africa and Thailand are now included. Thailand and Cambodia already have developed NIAPs and are engaged in implementation, but the participation of Sri Lanka and South Africa in this process should also be considered by the Parties at this time.
And, in terms of countries that are ‘important to watch’, Angola, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Egypt, Japan, Lao PDR, Mozambue and the Philippines are noted. All of these countries were previously prioritized in the CoP16 analysis, but the Philippines moves into this category from formerly being a ‘country of primary concern’, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Egypt and Mozambue were formerly ‘countries of secondary concern’, whilst Angola, Japan, Lao PDR, Qatar and United Arab Emirates remain in this category. The inclusion of Japan, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates in the NIAP process is something that the Parties may wish to consider at this time.
Table 4 presents a comparison with the cluster analysis presented to CoP16 together with a list of those countries or territories that the Parties subsequently agreed to subject to the NIAP process. Once again, with this assessment, it is the prerogative of the Parties to determine which countries or territories should be considered for inclusion in the NIAP process.
Table 4: Comparison with CoP16 and CoP17 cluster analyses and countries/territories participating in the National Ivory Action Plan (NIAP) process under CITES.
Priority Ranking CoP16 Cluster Analysis CoP17 Cluster Analysis Countries/Territories Currently Engaged in the NIAP Process Countries/territories of ‘primary concern’ China, Hong Kong SAR, Kenya, Malaysia, the Philippines, South Africa, Tanzania, Thailand, Viet Nam China, Hong Kong SAR, Kenya, Malawi, Malaysia, Singapore, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Viet Nam China, Hong Kong SAR, Kenya, Malaysia, the Philippines, Tanzania, Thailand, Uganda, Viet Nam Countries of ‘secondary concern’ Cameroon, Congo, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gabon, Mozambue, Nigeria, Taiwan (province of China), Uganda Cambodia, Cameroon, Congo, Ethiopia, Gabon, Nigeria, Sri Lanka, South Africa and Thailand Cameroon, Congo, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gabon, Mozambue, Nigeria Countries ‘important to watch’ Angola, Cambodia, Japan, Lao PDR, Qatar, United Arab Emirates Angola, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Egypt, Japan, Lao PDR, Mozambue, the Philippines, Qatar, United Arab Emirates Angola, Cambodia, Lao PDR.
Although this analysis covers an eight-year time period from 2007, it includes only a 20-month period of time since the CITES Parties, at CoP16 and the follow-on Standing Committee meeting, boldly launched the global NIAP process to combat illegal trade in ivory under the Convention. The results of this report make clear that Africa’s elephants continue to face a very serious threat from the illicit trade in ivory: while the findings provide a hint of improvement on the horizon, additional data in subsequent years will be required to confirm if a meaningful decline in the illicit ivory trade trend is commencing. In the meantime, there should be no cause for complacency in addressing illegal ivory trade threats to elephants.
Currently, some 19 countries have developed NIAPs and, in terms of implementation, many very positive actions have been taken by a wide range of players, but overall implementation is still very much at a nascent stage. Among these countries Thailand demonstrates very clear improvement in this analysis, having moved from the most problematic category into one of lesser concern, and such progress is indicative of the kind of positive achievement that is possible with dedicated and sustained commitment. For this reason, the continuation of the NIAP process needs to be further encouraged with renewed scrutiny and review of the various NIAPs to ensure that they adequately address the range of issues raised in this analysis. It is expected that a more robust picture of the impact of the NIAP process will be possible once data are available for the years 2015 and 2016. Towards that end, and within available resources, TRAFFIC hopes to conduct another analysis through 2015 prior to the commencement of CoP17 to derive a revised trend. Notification to the Parties No. 2016/037 of 1 April 2016 is presently requesting the Parties to submit all ivory and other elephant product seizure data to ETIS by 31 May 2016 for this purpose.
In the meantime, the continuing movement of large consignments of ivory between Africa and Asia again points to the involvement of transnational criminal syndicates. These operatives, typically of Asian origin but based in Africa, directly support major elephant poaching networks throughout the continent and control the bulk of ivory supply moving to Asia (Milliken, 2014). So far, the impact of increased law enforcement and cooperation at national and international scales along the trade chain is not decisively apparent, nor has it yet resulted in any significant change to previously documented global trade patterns in ETIS – though progress has been seen in individual countries.
There remains a need for greater and more focused commitment on the investigation of large-scale ivory seizures along the entire trade chain. In this regard, scaled-up forensic examination to source ivory is needed as most large seizures are not being examined in a timely manner as called for in Resolution Conf. 10.10 and Decision 16.83; this Decision should be extended at CoP17. Further, most countries where large seizures occur are failing to produce itemized inventory lists of the contents of these seizures (in many cases prior to stock destruction), which could serve the useful purposes of understanding average tusk weights and modeling the age structure and origins of the elephants being killed. The absence of dedicated, long-term investigations along the entire trade chain, and in appropriate languages, remains a factor of concern that inhibits successful progress (C. Dietrich, pers. comm., formerly INTERPOL). Where Asian nationals are arrested in Africa in major wildlife crime cases, interrogations and examination of documents, cell phones and computers whose contents are in foreign languages rarely effectively occurs, impeding successful prosecutions and the unmasking of the trade syndicates involved. And finally, the use of controlled deliveries as a means to penetrate deeper into the identities of large-scale criminal operatives is not yet a reality. The importance of focusing investigative and enforcement efforts on large-scale ivory seizures appears to have improved only marginally since the analysis to CoP16.
Enhancing the Elephant Trade Information System.
Objectives.
The Elephant Trade Information System (ETIS), monitors the illegal ivory trade. It is one of two global monitoring systems for elephants under CITES (Convention for International Trade in Endangered Species). ETIS is managed by TRAFFIC International and aims to:
assess illicit trade in ivory and other elephant products, establish trends over time determine whether or not such trends are related to CITES decisions.
To achieve this, ETIS collects and analyses illegal ivory seizure records received from law enforcement agencies in 175 countries (CITES Parties). Currently the database contains more than 16,000 records of illegal ivory seizures.
This Darwin Initiative project aims to build a firm foundation and framework for enhancing ETIS by focusing on the development of the following issues:
The database of seizure records is the central component of ETIS. The existing database software was developed in a now obsolete framework and after some ten years of operation the system is in need of major revision and upgrading.
This project developed new database software that will enable data providers to enter and access their own data on-line. The new software will also make it easier for TESA to manage and summarise records of illegal ivory seizures. This presentation to UNEP’s 4th African Elephant Meeting on 27 April 2012 gives a summary on the new database.
Analytical Framework.
To provide effective evidence to address the aims of ETIS, statistical analyses of the ETIS seizure records must address and reduce the many different sources of bias in the data. In particular, the data are biased because seizures do not represent a random sample of illegal ivory shipments, and because countries vary in their ability to seize and report ivory shipments – this blog post describes these difficulties in more detail. There are no off-the-shelf statistical tools available for this purpose. Analyses have hitherto been ad hoc, not peer-reviewed and produced in response to CITES reporting requirements. Furthermore, analytical results have not always been expressed in a simple way. For these reasons, ETIS is sometimes perceived by policy makers and the media as being too complex.
This project developed a new analytical framework to adjust for biases in the data. Simple indicators were identified for a new reporting framework so that reports to CITES can follow a clear, transparent and accepted process. The methodology and results were published as a paper in the peer-reviewed journal PLoS One – a video summary of the paper is given here.
Standard Operating Procedures.
Currently the operation of ETIS depends on a small number of key personnel and there are no measures to promote long-term sustainability.
This project developed standard operating procedures for ETIS. The database software is being developed in an open-source framework and automated tools to produce some of the reporting requirements for CITES will be provided.
A further source of bias in the data is the sporadic and uneven seizure rate, and reporting of seizures. For example, many elephant range States in Africa and Asia almost never report making ivory seizures themselves, but are regularly implicated in hundreds of seizures made elsewhere in the world.
In the light of the new database software, this project provided resources to revise existing training materials that TESA deploys to assist in monitoring and reporting procedures for seizures of illegal ivory.
My Contribution.
As project leader I had overall responsibility for project management. In addition I work jointly with Bob Burn in the development of the analytical framework.
Project Administration.
This project was funded by the Darwin Initiative from the the UK Government’s Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs. For project reports see the Darwin Initiative website for project 17-020 – Enhancing the Elephant Trade Information System to guide CITES policy.
The project was a collaboration between the University of Reading and TRAFFIC International.
Project Leader: Fiona Underwood (University of Reading) Project Partner: Bob Burn (University of Reading) Project Partner: Tom Milliken (TRAFFIC International)
I have experience of working on problems in natural resources management, food security, climate change, international development and the illegal wildlife trade. For more see [. ]
The Elephant Trade Information System (ETIS)
As its name suggests, ETIS is a comprehensive information system to track illegal trade in ivory and other elephant products. It shares the same objectives as those set out for MIKE in Resolution Conf. 10.10 (Rev. CoP16), with the difference that its aim is to record and analyse levels and trends in illegal trade, rather than the illegal killing of elephants. The central component of ETIS is a database on seizures of elephant specimens that have occurred anywhere in the world since 1989. The seizure database is supported by a series of subsidiary database components that assess law enforcement effort and efficiency, rates of reporting, domestic ivory markets and background economic variables. These database components are time-based and country-specific and are used to mitigate factors that cause bias in the data and might otherwise distort the analytical results. The subsidiary database components also assist in interpreting and understanding the results of the ETIS analyses. Since its inception, ETIS has been managed by TRAFFIC on behalf of the CITES Parties and is currently housed at the TRAFFIC East/Southern Africa office in Harare, Zimbabwe.
Monitoring illegal trade in elephant products and illegal killing of elephants was first mandated at the 10th meeting of the Conference of the Parties (CoP10, 1997, Harare) when the Conference of the Parties adopted Resolution Conf. 10.10 on Trade in elephant specimens. Among other things, Resolution Conf. 10.10 called for the establishment, under the supervision and direction of the Standing Committee, of a comprehensive international system to monitor the illegal trade in elephant specimens. Initially, an existing database of ivory seizure information, TRAFFIC’s Bad Ivory Database System (BIDS), was designated as the appropriate instrument for these purposes. To serve the needs of the CITES Parties more effectively, and through a consultative process involving a number of technical experts worldwide, BIDS eventually evolved into ETIS, a far more sophisticated monitoring tool.
Resolution Conf. 10.10 was later refined and strengthened at both the 11th and 12th meetings of the Conference of the Parties (2000, Gigiri, and 2002, Santiago, respectively). The fundamental objectives of the monitoring system are:
i) measuring and recording current levels and trends, and changes in levels and trends of illegal… trade in elephant range States, and in trade entrepots;
ii) assessing whether and to what extent observed trends are related to changes in the listing of elephant populations in the CITES appendices and/or the resumption of legal international trade in ivory;
iii) establishing an information base to support the making of decisions on appropriate management, protection and enforcement needs; and.
iv) building capacity in range States.
TRAFFIC is mandated to produce a comprehensive analytical report of the ETIS data assessing the factors addressed in the above objectives at each meeting of the Conference of the Parties. To ensure that there are sufficient data from which to assess illegal trade, the CITES Parties are mandated to communicate information on elephant ivory and other elephant product seizures to TRAFFIC via the CITES Secretariat within 90 days of their occurrence. While this time-frame is often ignored, it is worth noting that the seizure database has nonetheless grown from around 4,000 records from 40 countries or territories in 1997 to include over 10,394 cases, representing 77 countries and territories around the world, at the present time. Today, more Parties than ever before are actively contributing data to ETIS on a regular basis.
2. Progress to date.
Significant progress has been achieved since the initial adoption of Resolution Conf. 10.10. The following events were important milestones in the evolution of ETIS:
With the approval of the Standing Committee, TRAFFIC subjected BIDS to an external evaluation process, the results of which were refined at a workshop of technical experts convened in Nairobi, Kenya, in December 1997. At its 40th meeting (March 1998, London), the CITES Standing Committee approved the basic design elements of ETIS. At that meeting, the Standing Committee agreed to make available CHF 30,000, from the CITES Trust Fund, to assist in the technical refinement and further development of ETIS. To assist in the provision of information, the Secretariat circulated an Ivory and Elephant Product Seizure Data Collection Form to all Parties in Notification to the Parties No. 1998/10 of 31 March 1998. This form is to be completed and returned to the CITES Secretariat for transmission to TRAFFIC to report ivory seizures and confiscations. Through Notification to the Parties No. 1999/36 of 30 April 1999, the Secretariat also circulated Explanatory Notes for the "Ivory and Elephant Product Seizure Data Collection Form". These documents were re-circulated as a reminder with Notification to the Parties No. 1999/92 of 30 November 1999. A functional specification outlining the theory, structure and practical application of ETIS was produced by consultants at the University of Reading’s Statistical Services Centre. This facilitated the development of document Inf. SC.41.1 Development of the CITES Elephant Trade Information System (ETIS), presented at the 41st meeting of the CITES Standing Committee (Geneva, February 1999). In April 1999, with the assistance of technical consultants of the University of Reading's Statistical Services Centre, an MS/ACCESS-based, ETIS software programme for the seizure database was designed and installed at the TRAFFIC East/Southern Africa regional office. The first step in making ETIS fully operational involved the conversion of all previous data from the former BIDS system into the new programme. Covering the period 1 January 1989 to 31 October 1999, the first series of ETIS Country Reports were produced in September 2001 and circulated to 135 Parties through the CITES Secretariat in January 2000. The reports are tabular summaries of all seizures relating to a particular country, either because it is directly involved or has been identified as a source, transit or destination country of seizures that have taken place elsewhere, or because nationals of that country were involved in the illegal transaction. These reports create a valuable feedback loop with the Parties and allow for data to be verified and updated regularly. To update the Parties on progress, a report on the operation and status of ETIS was presented to CoP11 in April 2000. At that time, the database held 4,361 seizure records from 49 countries and territories around the world, but the subsidiary databases were still under development and a statistical analysis of the data was not possible. The report also noted that, in general, the Parties were not providing seizure data in a timely manner. As a result, TRAFFIC was encouraged by the Parties to play a more direct and active role in future data collection. The second series of ETIS Country Reports, covering the period 1 January 1989 to 28 February 2001, were produced in September 2001 and circulated to 179 Parties and non Parties by the CITES Secretariat in February 2002. To foster awareness and build capacity for the implementation of ETIS, TRAFFIC developed an ‘ETIS Action Toolkit’ in April 2002. This training tool comprises seven detailed, but highly adaptive, PowerPoint or overhead modular presentations on CITES, elephant conservation and ETIS. These presentations can underpin a comprehensive, two-day interactive workshop event, or be abbreviated into a brief presentation of 30 minutes duration as the case may be. Workshops have been held in Tanzania, and the ETIS Action Toolkit has been translated into Chinese for use in east Asia. In June 2002, TRAFFIC successfully completed the development of all of the subsidiary database components. These included a law enforcement effort measure based on the CITES National Legislation Project; a law enforcement efficiency measure based on the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) of Transparency International; a rate of reporting measure based on CITES annual report submissions; a rate of reporting measure based on a data collection scoring system; a domestic ivory market measure based on comparative information on the scale and degree of regulation of such markets; and a series of background economic variables that hold information on population, area, gross national product (GDP), per capita gross national income (GNI), inflation (GDP deflator) and aid per capita in each country since 1989. For CoP12, in September 2002, TRAFFIC, in collaboration with statisticians from the University of Reading's Statistical Services Centre, produced the first comprehensive analysis of the ETIS data. The three reports comprised a status report on the operational aspects of ETIS, a spatial analysis to identify those countries most prominently implicated in the illicit trade in ivory, and a temporal analysis to establish and assess the trend in illegal trade in ivory since 1989. These reports were in fulfilment of all of the mandated objectives for ETIS. They demonstrated that illicit trade in ivory is driven by large-scale, unregulated domestic ivory markets in Africa and Asia, and that there has been an increasing trend in illegal trade in ivory since 1998, which is largely due to the influence of an emerging market for ivory in China. The results of the ETIS studies were presented at the fifth dialogue meeting of the African elephant range States and to the CITES Parties at CoP12. Recommendations contained in the ETIS reports resulted in the adoption of Decision 12.39, which mandated an assessment of internal ivory trade controls in 10 key ivory markets: Cameroon, China, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Japan, Nigeria, Thailand, Uganda and the United States of America. The assessment report was submitted at the 50th meeting of the CITES Standing Committee in March 2004 [see document SC50 Doc. 21.1 (Rev. 1)]. The Parties also agreed to strengthen ETIS by mandating that it be supported by a Technical Advisory Group (TAG), in the same vein that the operation and development of MIKE is supported by a TAG. The third series of ETIS Country reports, covering the period 1 January 1989 to 29 September 2002, were produced and distributed to 160 CITES Parties and their dependent territories and 22 non Parties in April 2003. In December 2003, a major data collection exercise was launched to update ETIS to the extent possible prior to the production of the analytical report for the 13th meeting of the Conference of the Parties (CoP13) in October 2004. Letters of solicitation were sent to every CITES Party and territory requesting the timely submission of elephant product seizure records. The results of this consultation were reported at CoP13 in a report and executive summary. A progress report was prepared in June 2005.
ETIS has become a well-established and effective tool for monitoring illegal trade in elephant products under CITES. Together with MIKE, there is now a very promising basis for assessing decision-making for elephant conservation under CITES in a transparent and credible manner.
3. The funding for ETIS.
As noted in the following table, since 1997, a number of government institutions and organizations have supported the development and operation of ETIS. In particular, the United Kingdom’s Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA, formerly DETR) is the leading donor supporting ETIS. The World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), the CITES Secretariat and the United States Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS) have also provided valuable support.
World Elephant Day: Poaching remains ‘unacceptably high’ for African elephants.
Poaching has decimated elephant populations across Africa.
Every year, an estimated 30,000 African elephants are killed for the illegal ivory trade, and fewer than 400,000 animals are thought to remain today.
Now, two new reports suggest that the upward trend of elephant poaching for the illegal ivory trade — which started in 2006 — may be slowing down. But levels of poaching still remain “unacceptably high”, according to a statement by the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES).
The two CITES monitoring programs — the Elephant Trade Information System (ETIS) and Monitoring the Illegal Killing of Elephants (MIKE) — will present their reports at the 17 th meeting of the Conference of the Parties (CoP) to the CITES in September.
“There are some encouraging signs,” CITES Secretary-General, Mr John E. Scanlon said in the statement. “The momentum generated over the past five years is translating into deeper and stronger efforts to fight poaching and illicit trafficking on the front-lines, where it is needed most — from the rangers in the field, to police and customs at ports of entry and exit and across illicit markets… but much more remains to be done.”
Two new reports suggest that the sharp upward trend of killing elephants for the illegal ivory trade, which started in 2006, may be slowing down. Photo by Rhett Butler.
According to the ETIS report, levels of illegal ivory trade reached their highest levels in 2012 and 2013. In 2014, the only subsequent year with sufficient seizure data for analysis, illegal trade in ivory was lower. But to confirm a meaningful decline in this trade, additional data of following years would be necessary, conservationists say.
The MIKE report indicates that levels of illegal elephant killings peaked in 2011, and appear to have slowed or stabilized since then. In 2015, for example, poaching accounted for 60 percent of all African elephant deaths, down from around 75 percent in 2011.
However, levels of illegal killings still remain far too high to allow elephant populations to recover, the statement said. In fact, levels of poaching are higher than they were in the 2000s and may even lead to the local extinction of some elephant populations.
Moreover, poaching levels may be down simply because elephant numbers have plummeted and elephants are now harder to find, Susan Lieberman from the Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS), told the BBC.
Poaching remains especially high in Central and West Africa. Photo by Rhett Butler.
The picture is particularly grim for elephants in Central and West Africa where poaching still remains very high. In East Africa though, levels of poaching seem to be declining in some areas like Kenya.
The only region where deaths due to poaching does not exceed natural deaths is Southern Africa. Poaching levels do remain high in some Southern African sites, though, such as Niassa Reserve in Mozambue. Moreover, reports indicate a recent spike in elephant in South Africa’s Kruger National Park for the first time. If this current trend continues, elephant population in Kruger could face considerable decline in the future, conservationists warn.
“Governments must continue to strengthen their efforts right across the illegal ivory supply chain, while international bodies and civil society must further enhance their much-needed support if we are to reverse the devastating poaching trends of the past decade,” Scanlon said.
Reports indicate a recent spike in elephant in South Africa’s Kruger National Park for the first time. Photo by Rhett Butler.
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